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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT HAD NO DISCRETION TO
AMEND ITS ORDER TWENTY TWO MONTHS AFTER IT
WAS ENTERED.
In a written order dated August 23, 1985, the district
court gave Fairway 15 days to file a verified factual statement.
(Adden. A.)
On
to
to
to
no

On September 11, 1985, the district court wrote:

August 23, 1985, this court ordered the plaintiffs
file a verified factual statement about each party
be added. The court allowed the plaintiffs 15 days
file the document. Nineteen days have passed and
document has been filed with the court.
The motion to amend is denied.

(Adden. B.)

Twenty-two months later the district court amended

that order.

(R. 753-755, 787-792.)

Rule 60 governs the amendment of orders.

In its "Motion to

Correct the Court Order or in the Alternative to Amend the
Complaint to Include the Cause of Action Based on Strict
Liability" and supporting memoranda, (Adden. C ) , Fairway
appropriately

invoked and cited Rule 60(b).

excusable neglect.

Fairway claimed

Rule 60(b) grants no discretion to the

district court to alter an order for the reason of excusable
neglect after 30 days.
Fairway now claims Rule 15 applies.

When there is conflict

between rules, the more specific rule applies.
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See, e.g., North

Eastern Mining Co. v. Dorothy Coal Sales, Inc., 108 F.R.D. 657,
659 (D.Ind. 1985).

Rule 60 is the more specific rule, and

serves an important function in preserving the orderly, efficient administration of justice.
It is true that our new rules of civil procedure were
intended to eliminate undue emphasis on technicalities
and to provide liberality in procedure to the end that
disputes be heard and determined on their merits. However, this does not mean that procedure before the
courts has become entirely "without form and void."
The law itself is a system of rules designed to safeguard rights and preserve order, and administration of
justice under it must necessarily be carried on with
some degree or order. This can be accomplished only
by compliance with the rules established for that
purpose. Liberality in their interpretation and application should be indulged where no prejudice or disadvantage to anyone results, but where failure to
comply with the rules will result in some substantial
prejudice or disadvantage to a party, they should be
adhered to with fidelity.
Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v. Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402
P.2d 703, 704 (1965) (footnotes omitted).
Even though the new rules of procedure had as a part
of their purpose the removing of undue technicalities
and rigidities in the law, and are to be liberally
construed to effectuate justice, nevertheless, they
were designed to provide a pattern of regularity of
procedure which the parties and the courts could
follow and rely upon.
Drury v. Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 415 P.2d 662, 663 (1966).
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POINT II
EVEN IF THE COURT HAD DISCRETION TO ALTER ITS
EARLIER ORDER, IT ABUSED THAT DISCRETION.
Fairway claims Diehl's burden is "insurmountable," in other
words, this court is powerless to review the discretionary acts
of the district court.

Fairway's claim is erroneous.

In cases where abuse of discretion is raised [the
appellate court] will review the discretionary act
and, if abuse is involved, correct the abuse.
Puckett v. Cook, 586 P.2d 721, 723 (Okl. 1978).

Fairway's Motion to Correct the Court Order or in the Alternative to Amend the Complaint to Include a Cause of Action Based
on Strict Liability was filed on June 16, 1987, (Adden. C ) , 40
months after the claim arose, 31 months after the Complaint was
filed, following 2 pretrial hearings, and a little more than 1
month before trial. When a party seeks to amend the pleadings
late and on the eve of trial, the trial court must require a
reasonable explanation of the delay.

Girard v. Appleby, 660

P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983); Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817,
820 (Utah App. 1988); Tripp v. Vaughn, 746 P.2d 794, 797-98
(Utah App. 1987).
Fairway has never attempted to give an explanation of why a
strict liability claim was not stated in the original complaint.
Fairway alleged the closely related claim of breach of warranty,
which requires a sale. Why could it not have alleged strict
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liability, which Fairway claims requires little more than a
remote involvement in the sale of a product?

Fairway is unable

to give a reasonable explanation of the delay in seeking an
amendment of the 1985 Order.
The trial court must next consider whether prejudice would
occur by allowing the amendment.

Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth,

664, P.2d 455, 464 (Utah 1983); Kelly v. Utah Power & Light,
746 P.2d 1189, 1190 (Utah App. 1987).
It is true that our new rules should be "liberally
construed" to secure a "just . . . determination of
every action", but they do not represent a one-way
street down which but one litigant may travel. The
rules allow locomotion in both directions by all
interested travelers. They allow plaintiffs considerable latitude in pleading and proof, to the point
where some people have expressed the opinion that
careless legal craftsmanship has been invited rather
than discouraged. Be that as it may, a defendant must
be extended every reasonable opportunity to prepare
his case and to meet an adversary's claims. Also he
must be protected against surprise and be assured
equal opportunity and facility to present and prove
counter contentions, - else unilateral justice and
injustice would result sufficient to raise serious
doubts as to constitutional due process guarantees.
Taylor v. E.M. Royle Corp., 2 Utah 2d 175, 264 P.2d 279, 280
(1953) (quoting Rule 1(a) U.R.Civ.P.).
The district court acknowledged that Diehl was prejudiced
by the amendment, (Adden. D.), and delayed the trial 3 months
in an effort to minimize that prejudice.

Unfortunately, no

amount of delay in the trial could reduce the prejudice.
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One of the justifications for extending strict liability to
sellers other than the manufacturer is that there is little
prejudice to those sellers because the loss can be passed by
those sellers to the manufacturer.

See e.g., Vandermark v.

Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal.2d 256, 37 Cal.Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168,
172 (1964).

The Utah Court of Appeals has now made that right

of indemnity very significant.

A remote seller can recover

attorneys fees, costs and any liability to the plaintiff.
Hanover Ltd. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 758 P.2d 443 (Utah App.
1988).

Fairway's unreasonable delay destroyed Diehl's indem-

nity right.
The warehouse in question was constructed in 1979. The
trusses in question were made in July, 1979. As of July, 1986,
Diehl's claim for indemnity against Truss Teck was barred by
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953).
Truss Teck was dissolved on December 31, 1984.

(T.R. 318;

Def. Ex. 2, R. 1570.) As of December 31, 1986, Diehl's indemnity claim against Truss Teck was barred by Utah Code Ann.
§ 16-10-100 (1953).

Had Fairway raised a strict liability

claim before July 1986, Diehl could have and would have
asserted a claim for indemnity against Truss Teck.
A claim for contribution "arises" only when a defendant
pays more than his fair share.

Uniqard Ins. Co. v. City of

LaVerkin, 689 P.2d 1344, 1346 (Utah 1984); Utah Comparative
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Negligence Act, 1973 Utah Laws Ch. 209, § 3. An indemnity
claim "does not arise until the liability of the party seeking
indemnity results in his damage."

Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale

Supply, Co., 681 P.2d 214, 218 (Utah 1984).

A statute of

limitation ordinarily does not begin to run until a claim
"accrues" or "arises".

This, however, has nothing to do with

statutes of repose, which begin to run regardless of when the
claim arises:
Statutes of repose . . . are different from statute of
limitations . . . . A statute of limitations requires
a lawsuit to be filed within a specified period of time
after a legal right has been violated or the remedy
for the wrong committed is deemed waived. A statute
of repose bars all actions after a specified period of
time has run from the occurrence of some event other
than the occurrence of an injury that gives rise to a
cause of action.
Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 672 (Utah 1985)
(citations omitted).
A specific statutory limitation period that seeks
ultimate repose of causes of action will control over
a general statute of limitations, even to cut off an
indemnity action that technically has not accrued.
Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214, 218 (Utah
1984).
Fairway claims that Diehl chose not to sue Truss Teck
because the president of Diehl was the father of the president
of Truss Teck.

Fairway's attempt at clairvoyance is in error.

If Diehl were not insured against liability, its officers and
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directors would owe a fiduciary responsibility to shareholders
to seek indemnity, irrespective of their personal feelings.
Since Diehl does have liability insurance, the insurance carrier has the right to direct the defense and it could have, and
would have, insisted upon a claim of indemnity regardless of
Larry Diehl1s asserted altruism.
Diehl never had any exposure until the strict liability
claim, as this appeal well illustrates.
As Fairway has admitted, there never was any evidence of
Diehl's negligence or breach of warranty.

At most, any claim

of Diehl against Truss Teck on the negligence claim would have
been for contribution, not indemnity.

Diehl had no claim

against Truss Teck on the warranty claim, as Diehl did not
purchase the trusses from Truss Teck.

Any warranty claims

against Diehl or Truss Teck were barred by the Statute of Repose
found in Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-725 (1953), even before Fairway
filed its original complaint.

Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply

Co., 681 P.2d 214, 218 (Utah 1984).
Diehl's claim of indemnity against Truss Teck never even
accrued before the judgment.
raised before they accrue.

Ordinarily, claims cannot be

E.g., Jahnke v. Palomar Financial

Corp., 22 Ariz.App. 369, 527 P.2d 771, 775 (1974).
by rule, an exception to this principle.

There is,

Rule 14 allows a

defendant to "cause a summons and complaint to be served upon a
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person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him
for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him."

There

is no similar provision which allows a defendant to file a
third-party complaint seeking contribution or indemnity for a
claim which may, possibly, someday be stated by the plaintiff.
The rule applies only after the plaintiff has stated the claim
for which indemnity is sought.
Diehl, like the district court, assumed that if Fairway was
serious about amending its complaint, it would have complied
with the court's order of September 11, 1985:
The court assumed that if the plaintiff had been
serious about the cause of action, counsel would have
filed the required statement.
(Adden. D.)
Diehl assumed that Fairway would be required to comply with
Rule 60. Diehl assumed Fairway would be required to act timely.
Diehl assumes, even now, that the "rules" of civil procedure are
something more than mere suggestions.

Diehl also assumed that

if Fairway had been serious about the strict liability claim,
Fairway would have sued Truss Teck.

While Truss Teck was dis-

solved in 1984, there may well have been insurance coverage or
traceable assets.
Fairway champions a double standard.

It says it was reason-

able for it to have made an "assumption" - unsupported by any
record before this court - that the district court had dealt
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with the proposed amended complaint in portions, rather than as
a whole, and that the court had dealt with the strict liability
claim differently than the claims against new parties.
despite a written order to the contrary.

This,

If Fairway really

believed it had raised a strict liability claim, why didn't it
insist on an answer to that claim?
Fairway, on the other hand, claims it was unreasonable for
Diehl to rely upon the written order of the court, the pleadings, and the rules of civil procedure in failing to assert a
claim that had not accrued, might never do so, and could not be
filed under Rule 14.
Fairway's claim before this court is: Fairway is to be
excused for failing to read the court's written order.

Diehl

is to be dammed for failing to read the mind of Fairway's
counsel.
The loss of its indemnity rights is not the only prejudice
suffered by Diehl.

Fairway's strict liability claim came 8

years after the trusses were made and 40 months after the accident.

In that time, witnesses died, memories dimmed, busines-

ses dissolved, and business records were lost or destroyed.
Neither 3 months, nor 3 years of additional discovery could
have cured that prejudice.
Abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court:
1.

exceeds bounds of reason;

2.

disregards rules; or
-9-

3.

disregards principles of law or practice, to the

detriment of a party litigant.

E.g., Gakiya v. Hallmark

Props. , Inc., 722 P.2d 460, 463 (Haw. 1986).
Here the district court:
1.

exceeded the bounds of reason;

2.

disregarded Rule 60;

3.

disregarded the rule of law requiring it to deny

amendment absent a reasonable explanation of the delay from
Fairway; and
4.

ignored patent and unavoidable prejudice to Diehl.
POINT III
ONE WHO NEGOTIATES THE SALE OF PRODUCTS
BETWEEN BUYER AND SELLER IS NOT STRICTLY
LIABLE FOR DEFECTS IN THOSE PRODUCTS.

Persons who negotiate a sale between buyer and seller are
not strictly liable for defects in the goods sold.

See,

Brejcha v. Wilson Machinery, Inc., 160 Cal.App.3d 630, 206
Cal.Rptr. 688, (Cal.App.Ct. 1984).

In that case, the

California Court of Appeals held an auctioneer who received a
metal-rolling machine on consignment and advertised and sold
the machine, "as is", as the agent of the seller, was not
strictly liable for defects in the machine.

The court based

its decision on the fact that the defendant had not taken title
to the machine and had not made any warranties or
representations.

206 Cal.Rptr. at 694.
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Fairway claims a great deal of authority for the proposition
that a "broker" is strictly liable.

Careful examination of

those cases discloses no such support.
Fairway claims the Illinois Supreme Court in Hammond v.
North American Asbestos Corp., 97 111.2d 195, 454 N.E.2d 210
(1983), found the defendant strictly liable "because it acted
as a sole sales agent for Cape's [Cape Asbestos Company, the
manufacturer] product."

Fairway does not mention that the

defendant was the wholly owned subsidiary of Cape.
213.

Id. at

While the defendant claimed to be only a broker, ^d. at

216, it does not appear that position was accepted by either
the jury or the Illinois Supreme Court:
Defendant's annual reports to the Secretary of State
of Illinois from 1955 to 1961 listed defendant's
business as the manufacture and sale of asbestos.
Many of the documents were submitted by plaintiff to
prove that defendants sold large quantities of raw
asbestos to Calabrian Industries (Calabrian) a barter
corporation. . .
Joan Holtze, a former employee of defendant from 1953
until 1978, testified defendant was incorporated to be
a contact point in north America for Cape customers.
While admitting defendant made a few direct sales of
asbestos, she said it primarily functioned as a message
relay center between Cape and Cape's North American
Asbestos' customers . . . .

One of defendant's former presidents testified that
defendant neither accepted any orders or contracts for
asbestos on behalf of Cape nor had authority to do so.
He acknowledged, though, that he represented defendant
as its attorney in the preparation and negotiation of
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the agreement with Calabrian to supply asbestos under
the barter contracts . . . .
Id. at 213-14.
The court in Hammond never discussed whether a broker could
be held strictly liable.

It simply held:

There was ample evidence from which the jury could
conclude defendant's role in marketing the asbestos
was sufficient to support liability under strict
liability theory.
Id. at 217.
The Illinois Court of Appeals unequivocally rejected the
argument that the defendant was a broker:
Irrespective of defendant's role in the marketing of
asbestos in its normal course of business, this argument ignores the evidence adduced concerning the government contract sales. The testimony and documents
disclose that Calabrian directly negotiated contracts
between defendant and itself to supply asbestos for the
federal government's stockpile of critical materials.
Thus, insofar as the government contract sales are concerned, defendant became a seller within the meaning
of the Restatement for which liability attaches.
Hammond v. North American Asbestos Corp., 105 Ill.App.3d 1033,
435 N.E.2d 540, 544-45 (Ill.App.Ct. 1982).
Fairway claims the defendant in Zamora v. Mobile Corp., 101
Wash. 2d 199, 704 P.2d 584 (1985), "was a broker of propane
gas."

That description is in error.

The defendant in Zamora

purchased and resold the product on its own behalf, not as
another's agent:
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Significantly, respondent never had possession or
control of the propane here. It bought and sold the
gas completely as a paper transaction.
Id. at 587. The court found a sale had occurred and the defendant was a "seller" within the meaning of 402A.
Fairway represents that the defendant, Pacor, in Weber v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 630 F. Supp. 285 (D.N.J. 1986), was a
"broker" a "voice over the phone" and that the brokerage service
"was an isolated and limited feature of its overall business.1'
Fairway's interpretation is in error.

The court in Weber framed

the issue as follows:
[W]e are called upon to predict what a New Jersey
court would do if confronted with the two critical
issues presented here, namely, whether self-styled
mere brokers may be held strictly liable in tort and,
perhaps more fundamentally, whether Pacor is in fact a
"mere broker."
Id. at 286.

The court never reached the first issue.

Pacor was not an ordinary broker or, to use Story's
words, "strictly a middleman." . . . Against this
background it would be a mischaracterization of the
record to characterize Pacor as a "mere broker;"
perhaps "broker plus" would be more apropos. In any
event, because the mere broker label does not apply,
Pacor's motion premised on that notion need not be
addressed further and will be denied.
Id. at 287-88 (emphasis in original).
The Weber case is the only case cited by Fairway where the
court clearly defined the term "broker."
The only "broker" case cited by Fairway which appears to
give some support to Fairway's position is Hoffman v. Loos &

-13-

Dilworth, Inc., 307 Pa.Super. 131, 452 A.2d 1349 (1982).
holding in that case, however, is far from clear.

The

In that case

the plaintiff's decedent received fatal injuries in a fire
caused by rags soaked in linseed oil.

The plaintiffs sued Loos

& Dilworth, Inc., which filed claims against Honeymead Products
Company, C.J. Osborn Chemicals Company and E.W. Kaufmann
Company.

The trial court granted Kaufmann summary judgment.

Loos & Dilworth and Honeymead appealed.

Loos & Dilworth and

Honeymead claimed Kaufmann had purchased, taken title to and
resold the linseed oil in question.

id. at 1352 n. 1.

E.W.

Kaufmann claimed it usually took title to linseed oil it resold,
but did not do so with respect to oil sold to Loos & Dilworth.
id. at 1353 n. 2.
The appellate court reversed the summary judgment.

The

court, however, does not appear to have resolved the issue of
whether Kaufmann actually purchased and resold the linseed oil
on its own behalf.
The tort law of Utah is, with few exceptions, based upon the
principals of negligence.
swallowed the rule.

Fairway claims the exceptions have

Such an assertion is simply unsupportable.

For example, courts have generally denied application of
strict liability to hospitals or medical practitioners for injuries suffered from medical products used in treatment.

In

Silverheart v. Mount Zion Hosp., 20 Cal.App.3d 1022, 98 Cal.
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Rptr. 187 (Cal.App.Ct. 1971), the court rejected the
application of strict liability to a hospital in an action by a
patient injured when a surgical needle broke.

In Magrine v.

Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 538, aff'd, Magrine v.
Spector, 53 N.J. 259, 250 A.2d 129, (N.J. 1969) the court
refused to impose strict liability upon a dentist who's patient
received injuries when a hypodermic needle broke.

See also

Annot., 54 A.L.R.3d 258 (1974).
Generally, the courts have refused to apply strict liability
to financing lessors.

E.g., Abco Metals Corp. v. J.W. Imports

Co., 560 F. Supp. 125 (N.D.I11. 1982) aff'd, Abco Metal Corp.
v. Equico Lessors, Inc., 721 F.2d 583 (7th Cir. 1983) (applying
Illinois law). See also, Annot. 28 A.L.R.4th 326 (1984).
While there is some authority to the contrary, persons who
overhaul or rebuild products and place them back into service
are not strictly liable for defects.

E.g., Barry v. Stevens

Equip. Co., 176 Ga.App. 27, 335 S.E.2d 129 (1985); Swenson
Trucking & Excavating, Inc. v. Truckweld Equip. Co., 604 P.2d
1113, 1116-17 (Alaska 1980);

See also, Annot., 29 A.L.R.3d

1425 (1970).
While there may be authority to the contrary, installers
have generally not been held strictly liable for defects in
products installed, even where the products are of no use unless
and until installed.

E.g., Hinojasa v. Automatic Elevator Co.,
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92 Ill.App.3d 351, 416 N.E.2d 45, 47-48 (Ill.App.Ct. 1980);
Hoover v. Montgomery Ward & Co. Inc., 270 Ore. 498, 528 P.2d 76
(1974).
Generally, strict liability has not been extended to persons
who provide products for transportation where there is no sale.
For example, strict liability was held not to apply to the owner
of a ski tram in Bolduc v. Herbert Schneider Corp., 117 N.H.
566, 374 A.2d 1187 (1977).

In Ruiz v. Southern Pacific Transp.

Co., 97 N.M. 194, 638 P.2d 406, 411-12 (N.M.App. 1981), a
person injured by a freight train could not recover under a
theory of strict liability.

See also, Siciliano v. Capital

City Shows, Inc., 124 N.A. 719, 475 A.2d 19, 25 (1984)
(amusement ride).
Fairway claims "licensors" are strictly liable and cites for
this proposition the case of Garcia v. Halsett, 3 Cal. App. 3d
319, 82 Cal.Rptr. 420 (1970), where a young boy was injured by
a washing machine at a local laundry mat.
not appear to have wide acceptance.

That position does

See, Siciliano v. Capital

City Shows, Inc., 124 N.H. 719, 475 A.2d 19, 25 (1984) (amusement ride); Keen v. Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc., 49 111.App.3d
480, 364 N.E.2d 502, 504-05 (Ill.App.Ct. 1977) (strict liability
does not apply to a grocery store customer injured by shopping
cart).

Wagner v. Coronet Hotel, 10 Ariz.App. 296, 458 P.2d

390, 394-95 (Ariz. App. 1969) (hotel not strictly liable when
guest injured by defective bath mat); Dixon v. Four Seasons
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Bowling Alley, Inc., 176 N.J.Super. 540, 424 A.2d 428, 430-31
(1980) (bowling alley not strictly liable for defects in
bowling ball made available for use by patrons).
At least one student of products of liability does not share
Fairway's view of the explosion in strict liability:
The Restatement (Second) of Torts provision on strict
liability in tort imposes the liability on one who
sells a product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the use or consumer. It limits its application to a seller who is engaged in the business of
selling such products and the cases where it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it was sold.
Under this rule, the sale of a chattel is an element
of its application. In the discussion which has preceded this section, it was pointed out that in some
instances strict liability in tort has been applied
even though there was no sale. The most common situation of this is the case of a lease of goods, as
demonstrated by the Cintrone [(Cintrone v. Hertz Truck
Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769
(1965)] decision. But the departure from the Restatement rule to achieve this strict liability result is
not particularly startling since that case involved a
lessor whose business it was to put goods into the
stream of commerce by leases instead of through sales
transactions. In other words, the case did involve a
situation of the distribution of goods.
Without a sale, and aside from the type of case involved in Cintrone, cases have been very sparce in
applying strict liability in tort.
2 L. Frumer & M. Freedman, Products Liability § 3.03[4][vi],
pp. 3-444 through 3-447 (1988).
People who design or engineer products without manufacturing them are not strictly liable.

See, Huang v. Garner, 157

Cal.App.3d 404, 203 Cal.Rptr. 800, 804 n. 5 (Cal.App.Ct. 1984);
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Castaldo v. Pittsburqh-Des Moines Steel Co. Inc., 376 A.2d 88,
90-91 (Del.Supr. 1977).
Fairway tries to create more exceptions to the general rule
of negligence law than actually exist.

Fairway claims that

"distributors" and "importers" are also examples of strictly
liable nonsellers.

Careful examination of the cases cited by

Fairway reveals that the "importers" and "distributors" were
simply sellers.
Contrary to Fairway's assertions, there appears to be at
least a legislative trend toward restricting the application of
strict liability to manufacturers.

Colorado, Kentucky, Nebraska

and Tennessee have statutes which limit the application of
strict liability to manufacturers, at least where the manufacturer is subject to service of process and solvent.

Colo.

Rev. Stat. § 13-21-402 (1987); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 411.340
(Michie/Robbs-Merrill Supp. 1988); Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-106
(Supp. 1988); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21, 181 (1943).
The proposed Model Uniform Product Liability Act imposes
strict liability on a nonmanufacturing seller only if that
seller makes an express warranty or the manufacturer has been
judicially declared insolvent or the court determines it is
highly probably the claimant would be unable to enforce a
judgment against the manufacturer.

3 L. Frumer & M. Freedman,

Products Liability, § 9.02[2], p. 9-45 (1988).
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The proposed federal Product Liability Reform Act of 1986
does not impose liability upon nonmanufacturing sellers unless
those sellers had a reasonable opportunity to inspect the
product and reasonably should have discovered the defect, or
the manufacturer is not subject to service, or the court determines the claimant would be unable to enforce a judgment against
the manufacturer.

3 L. Frumer & M. Freedman, Products Liabil-

ity, § 9.09[2], p. 9-437 (1988).
Fairway argues that lessors and bailors do not "sale"
products.

In layman's terms that may be correct.

In legal

terms, that is a very simplistic view:
A "sale'1 consists of the passing of title from the
seller to the buyer for a price . . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-106(l) (1953).
This section does not say that fee simple absolute title
need be conveyed, although that is certainly a laymen's view of
the term "sale."
interest.

A title interest may involve a leasehold

Courts have expanded the term "seller" consistent

with the Anglo-American concept that property title consists of
a bundle of divisible rights.

Courts have not divorced strict

liability completely from the concept of title, or the law of
warranty from whence it sprang.

Strict liability should be

limited to those who convey some title and make some implied
representations of quality.
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Instead of this concrete and understandable test, Fairway
suggests the following shibboleth: "Participation in the chain
of distribution."
If the "chain" referred to is not the chain of title or the
chain of possession, what does this mean?

Does the worker on

the production line "participate in the chain of distribution?"

Does the trucker that hauls the product "participate in

the chain of distribution"?

Does the bank that finances the

dealer's purchase of products and factors accounts receivables
"participate in the chain of distribution"?

Does the retail

sales clerk "participate in the chain of distribution".

Without

these people, products cannot move from manufacturer to user in
today's world.
Fairways test if tautological.

We first decide if strict

liability should be imposed, then we recant the shibboleth: the
defendant "participated in the chain of distribution."
Without the requirement of a sale, there is no rational way
to exclude the application of strict liability to those who
provide services.
or services?

Does a doctor provide a hypodermic needle,

Does the professional engineer who designs a

product provide services, or the product?
provide a service or the items sold?

Does an auctioneer

Does a broker provide the

service of getting buyer and seller together, or a product?
Does the individual car salesman provide a service or the car?
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The answer, of course, depends upon semantics.

Without the

requirement of a sale, the application of strict liability will
be limitless.
Fairway is critical of Diehl's insistence that this court
at least examine the public policy of strict liability.

Again

Fairway adopts a simplistic approach: what's best for the consumer is "the ultimate," the beginning and the end, all that
matters.
It sometimes seems that the obvious has escaped those
dealing with strict liability.

This court cannot make the loss

in question go away, it can only reassign it.

Fairway would

have this court create a chosen class, "the consumer," who can
transfer their loses to any nonnegligent person remotely connected with the product who is not of the chosen.

This, despite

equal protection guarantees of the state and federal constitutions.
POINT IV
FAIRWAY'S ASSERTION THAT DIEHL DID NOT ADEQUATELY OBJECT TO INSTRUCTION 15 IS WITHOUT
MERIT.
Diehl's objection to Instruction 15 was as follows:
MR. DRANEY: On behalf of defendants, Diehl Lumber
Company, your Honor, we would like to make the following exceptions to the jury instructions of the Court
as indicated that it would give.
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First of all, Instruction No. 15. This was
an instruction submitted by the plaintiffs and it
states: 'The law involved in this lawsuit is known as
the law of strict products liability. Pursuant to this
law, manufacturers, distributors, brokers, as well as
all other parties in the chain of distribution are
strictly liable for damages caused by defectively
designed products.'
THE COURT: Can I ask you not to read it.
state your objections.

Just

MR. DRANEY; All right. I apologize, your Honor.
I went through an appeal where there was some confusion
about the number and that's the reason why,
THE COURT:
to, go ahead.

All right.

If you feel like you need

MR. DRANEY: 'This is true so long as that party
is in the business of, and gains profit from, distributing or otherwise disposing of the "product" in
question through the stream of commerce.'
I think I read enough so we can find it and
understand what instruction we are talking about.
Particularly take exception, your Honor, to the part
that says, 'The primary justification for extending
strict liability to all in the chain of distribution
is to provide the "maximum of protection" to the
consumer.'
Maximum protection is in quotes. I think
that misstates the law. I think strict liability was
intended to relieve plaintiffs of a burden of proof
and I don't think that that is the only consideration
it implies. It says, 'This policy is as applicable to
those who never handle or control the product, as it
is to those who do possess or control the product.'
Again, one of the issues we are talking about
here is a broker and whether a broker possesses a
product, he dos control it and if we didn't control it
in some sense, then we are not responsible in strict
liability. This says that we are.
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It goes on to say, 'In either case,
consumer' —
THE COURT: I don't think you need to give all of
your argument before me.
MR. DRANEY: I am not. I am just trying to make
my record. I am not trying to argue, your Honor.
THE COURT: I understand, but I think you only
have to object to the instruction just briefly, don't
you?
MR. DRANEY: No. I think you have to state the
grounds, your Honor. You do have to state your grounds
to protect your record.
It says, 'In either case, consumer protection is the ultimate factor considered.' I think this
emphasis or it tries to imply to the jury that they can
disconcern themselves with all of the other facts and
to get to the heart of it and that is, pay these people
because they had a product that didn't work right. I
think there's more to it than that. I think it misstates the law and I think it's misleading, your Honor.
Diehl's objection was certainly clear enough to convey to
the district court Diehl's objection that the "ultimate factor"
language encouraged the jury to ignore all else, except that
which was good for the "consumer."

The instruction directed a

verdict against Diehl.
POINT V
FAIRWAY'S CLAIM THAT DIEHL WAS "AFFORDED THE
OPPORTUNITY TO FULLY LITIGATE THE ISSUE OF
TRUSWAL'S FAULT AT TRIAL" IS IN ERROR.
The district excused Truswal from trial without entering a
default judgment on the cross-claim or determining whether the
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settlement between Truswal and Fairway complied with the
statutes covering contribution among joint tortfeasors.

The

district court had indicated it would not submit Truswal's
negligence to the jury, until it reversed itself only the
morning before the case was submitted to the jury.

When the

case was submitted to the jury, the court refused to give a
simple instruction outlining Diehl's claims against Truswal
(Tr. 452). Parties are entitled to have their case presented
to the jury.

E.g., Goode v. Dayton Disposal, Inc., 738 P.2d

638 (Utah 1987).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment against Diehl should
be reversed with instructions to the district court to enter a
judgment of no cause of action in favor of Diehl.

In the alter-

native, this matter should be reversed^ for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted this Z3~^~~ a a y 0 f Jatiuary, 1989.

E. Draney
Attorneys for Appellap^Diehl
Lumber Company
SCMSED565
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In the District Court of the Second Judicial District
IN AND POR THE

County of Davis, State of Utah
FAIRWAY DISTRIBUTION CO.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BANGERTER CONSTRUCTION, et al.,
Defendants.

RULING ON MOTION TO
FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT
Civil No. 37017

The plaintiff's motion to file an amended complaint came before the court on August 13, 1985, with Merlin 0. Baker appearing
for the plaintiff and David S. Cook appearing for the defendant.
After oral argument, the court took the motion under advisement.
Courts should liberally grant motions to amend complaints.
However, this liberality is not absolute. In this case, the defendants have challenged the plaintiff's application to file such
an amendment. This court is not satisfied it has sufficient facts
to rule on the motion. The plaintiffs are ordered to file a verified factual statement about each party to be added, stating the
evidence which justifies adding them as a party. In addition, the
defendants claim the insurance company to be added is, in fact, defendant's insurance company. The court will allow the plaintiff
fifteen days to file the required statement with the court, afterwhich time the court will rule on this motion.
Dated August 23, 1985.
BY THE COURT:

ADDENDUM A

Certificate of Mailing:
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to Merlin 0. Baker, P. 0.
Box 3850, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3850; David S. Cook, 85
West 400 North, Bountiful, Utah 84010; and Max D. Wheeler, P.
0. Box 3000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 on August 23, 1985.

Deputy Ciferk

In the District Court of the Second Judicial District
IN AND FOR THE

County of Davis, State of Utah
FAIRWAY DISTRIBUTION CO.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BANGERTER CONSTRUCTION, et al.,
Defendant.

RULING ON MOTION TO
FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT
Civil No. 37017

On August 23, 1985, this court ordered the plaintiffs to
file a verified factual statement about each party to be added,
The court allowed the plaintiffs 15 days to file the document.
Nineteen days have passed and no document has been filed with
the court.
The motion to amend is denied.
Dated September 11, 1985.
BY THE COURT:

Certificate of Mailing:
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true^ and
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to Merlin 0. Baker, P. 0.
Box 3850, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3850; David S. Cook, 85
West 400 North, Bountiful, Utah 84010; and Max D. Wheeler, P. 0.
Box 3000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 on September 11, 1985.

Deputy Cl^i

ADDENDUM B

A&£&-

MERLIN 0. BAKER (A0180) Of
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
400 Deseret Building
79 South Main Street
P. 0. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Telephone: (801) 532-1500

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
FAIRWAY DISTRIBUTING CO.,
FAIRWAY LIMITED, a partnership
Plaintiffs,
v.
MOTION TO CORRECT COURT
ORDER OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE
TO AMEND COMPLAINT TO
INCLUDE A CAUSE OF ACTION
BASED ON STRICT LIABILITY

BANGERTER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY;
JOHN MARK BANGERTER; BONNEVILLE
ENGINEERING, INC.; TRUSWAL
SYSTEMS, INC.; COLONIAL LUMBER,
INC.; and DIEHL LUMBER COMPANY,
Defendants.
JOHN MARK BANGERTER,

Civil No. CV 37017

Third-Party
Plaintiff,
v.
AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF
READING PENNSYLVANIA; CNA
INSURANCE COMPANIES, TRUCK
INSURANCE EXCHANGE and
FARMERS INSURANCE GROUP,
Third-Party
Defendants.
ooOoo

ADDENDUM C

COME NOW the plaintiffs pursuant to Rule 60(b) and
Rule 15 and move the Court to correct an Order dated September 11,
1985, in which the Court denied plaintiffs' Motion to Amend their
Complaint to add certain parties defendant and an Eighth Cause of
Action based on strict liability, or in the alternative, to allow
plaintiff to amend its Complaint to include a cause of action
based on strict liability.

As grounds for said Motion, the

plaintiffs represent to the Court as follows:
On July 16, 1985, the plaintiffs filed a Motion to Amend
their Complaint to add as parties defendant James Mark Bangerter,
d/b/a Bangerter Construction Corporation, J.C. Bangerter & Sons,
Inc. and Bangerter Development Corporation, and to add an Eighth
Cause of Action based on strict liability.

No opposition was

filed by any of the parties to the Motion to Amend the Complaint
to add a strict liability count.
At the hearing on the Motion to Amend on August 13, 1985,
David Cook, attorney for John Mark Bangerter, appeared and opposed
that part of the Motion to Amend which sought the joinder of
additional parties defendants.

None of the attorneys representing

the defendants, Colonial Lumber, Inc., Diehl Lumber Company or
Truswal Systems, Inc. appeared at the hearing to oppose the Motion
to Amend the Complaint to add a count based on strict liability,
nor was there any objection by David Cook to this additional cause
of action.
The argument before the Court involved whether or not the
aforementioned Bangerter defendants should be added as parties
-2-

defendant.

The Court took the Motion under advisement, and on

August 23, 1985, issued an Order indicating that the plaintiffs
had within 15 days to supply the factual basis upon which the
Court could determine whether or not the additional parties should
be added.

This Order is attached as Exhibit "A".
Subsequent to the Order of August 23, 1985, the

plaintiffs determined that they would not seek to add the
additional parties defendant and accordingly the Motion to Amend
to add additional parties was moot.

On September 11, 1987, the

Court entered its Order denying plaintiffs' Motion to Amend the
Complaint.

A copy of this Order is attached as Exhibit

M

BM.

Since the argument and the focus of the hearing before
the Court had been on the joining of the additional parties, the
plaintiffs' attorney assumed that the Motion to add the cause of
action on strict liability had been granted and by oversight did
not request a clarification of the Court's Order relative to the
addition of the strict liability count inasmuch as it had not been
opposed by any of the parties.
The plaintiffs, in their present Complaint, have alleged
a cause of action based upon implied warranty which is similar to
strict liability as indicated in the case of Ernest W. Hahn, Inc.
v, Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah, 1979).

This case also

involved a roof collapse.
The jury also found defendant had breached
its implied warranty of merchantability to the
plaintiff and that such breach proximately caused
plaintiff damage. The elements of both actions
[implied warranty and strict liability] are
essentially the same and analysis for the purpose
-3-

of determining defenses to breach of implied
warranty parallels that for strict products
liability.
Id. at 159.

A copy of the Hahn case is attached as Exhibit "C" .

The causes of action and the elements of proof of strict
liability and implied warranty are similar.

The defendants will

not be prejudiced by the inclusion in the Complaint of a count
based on strict liability.

The Court's Order of September 11,

1985 should be corrected to reflect that plaintiffs' Motion to
Amend the Complaint to add a cause of action in strict liability
should have been granted, or in the alternative, the plaintiffs
should be allowed to amend their Complaint at this time to include
a cause of action based on strict liability.
DATED this

|L

day of June, 1987.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

Merlin 0. BakersAttorneys for Plaintiffs
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

\jQ

day of June, 1987, a

true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Correct Court
Order or in the Alternative to Amend Complaint to Include a Cause
of Action Based on Strict Liability was hand-delivered to:
Shawn E. Draney, Esq.
R. Brent Stephens, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Attorneys for Bonneville Engineering
and Diehl Lumber
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Phillip S. Ferguson, Esq.
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
510 Clark Learning Building
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Defendant
Truswal Systems, Inc.
Don J. Hanson, Esq,
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN
1300 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendants
Truck Insurance Exchange and
Farmers Insurance Group
Scott W. Christensen, Esq.
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH
175 South West Temple, #650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for CNA Insurance Companies
and mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Norman O. Fox, Esq.
686 West 3100 South
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Attorney for Colonial Lumber, Inc.
David S. Cook
85 West 400 North
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Attorney for Defendants
Bangerter Construction Co.
and John Mark Bangerter

55b
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In the District Court of the Second Judicial District
IN AND FOR THE

County of Davis, State of Utah

FAIRWAY DISTRIBUTING,

)

Plaintiff,

)

vs.

RULING ON MOTIONS

)

BANGERTER CONSTRUCTION, et al.,
Defendants.

)

Civil No- 37017

)

A number of motions in this case came before the court for
oral argument on June 23, 1987. After oral argument, the court
took the motions under advisement.
The plaintiff's attorney, Merlin 0. Baker, complained
bitterly because the court had denied his motion to file an
amended complaint.
On August 23, 1985, the court gave the
plaintiff fifteen days to file a verified factual statement
justifying the amended complaint.
No such statement was ever
filed by the plaintiff. On September 11, 1985, the court denied
the motion to file an amended complaint. Counsel of record at
the time, other than plaintiff, expressed relief that strict
liability was not going to be an issue. The intent of the court
was not to prevent the plaintiff from being heard on a legitimate
cause of action.
The court assumed that if the plaintiff had
been serious about the cause of action, counsel would have filed
the required statement. Opposing counsel now cry "foul" because
they have not prepared for trial on strict liability.
The court grants the plaintiff's motion to amend the
complaint to include a cause of action for strict liability. The
plaintiff is ordered to file the amended complaint within ten
days from today.
This prejudices opposing counsel in their

ADDENDUM D

readiness for trial. The current trial date of July 29, 30, 31
is vacated. A new trial date of October 28, 29, 30, 1987 at 9:00
A. M. is ordered by the court. A new pre-trial date of October
6, 1987, at 4:00 P. M. is ordered.
The court is also going to sever some aspects of this case
from the initial trial. No insurance company, as a party, will
be involved in the initial trial. Fairway Distributing Company
will be the plaintiff and John Mark Bangerter, Bangerter
Construction Company, Colonial Lumber, Inc., Diehl Lumber
Company, and Truswall Systems, Inc. will be the defendants. All
cross-claims and counter-claims which each of these parties have
against the others will be heard at the initial trial.
The plaintiff is still ordered to prepare a pre-trial order,
but not until after final pre-trial on October 6, 1987.
The court will separately rule on defendant, Bangerter's
motion for summary judgment when time allows. Other motions will
likewise be ruled on or delayed until the initial trial of the
case.
The plaintiff is ordered to draw a formal order based on
this ruling.
Dated July 9, 1987.
BY THE COURT:

Certificate of Mailing:
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to Merlin 0. Baker, P. 0.
Box 45385, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385; David S. Cook, 85
West 400 North, Bountiful, Utah 84010; Don J. Hanson, 1300
Continental Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101; Shawn E.
Draney, P. O. Box 45000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145; Scott W.
Christensen, 650 Clark Learning Office Center, 175 South West
Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101; Phillip S. Ferguson, 510
Clark Learning Building, 175 South West Temple, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84101; and Norman 0. Fox, 686 West 3100 South, Bountiful,
Utah 84010 on July 9, 1987.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
SHAWN E. DRANEY, 'being duly sworn, states that he is the
attorney for appellant Diehl Lumber Company and that he served four
copies of the attached:
APPELLANT DIEHL LUMBER COMPANY'S REPLY BRIEF
on the following parties:
Merlin 0. Baker, Esq.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
400 Deseret Building
79 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385

Michael J. Cooper, Esq.
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.
City Centre I, Suite 330
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314

Peter M. Katsaros, Esq.
CLAUSEN, MILLER, GORMAN, CAFFREY
& WITOUS, P.C.
5400 Sears Tower
Chicago, Illinois
60606

Attorneys for American
Casualty and CNA Insurance
Company

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Don J. Hanson, Esq.
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN
Suite 1300 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Phillip S. Ferguson, Esq.
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
510 Clark Learning Building
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Defendant
Truswal Systems, Inc.

Attorneys for Third-Party
Defendants Truck Insurance
Exchange and Farmers Insurance
Group

mailed first class, pastage, erepaid,
Qz^/

and caused the same to be

on the 2$ ^ d a y of

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to be

n

L^^AA^X^

My Commission Expires:

,A^

Notary fPublic
Residing in the Scate of Utah

